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Court of Appeals No.: 20150211 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(h) and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) provide this Court with 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the Civil Stalking !~junction ("Injunction") entered on 
March 5, 2015, by the Third District Judicial Court, Judge Robert Adkins, presiding. A copy 
of the Injunction is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSSUES 
RESTATED ISSUE #1: Did the trial court proper!J app/y the dvil stalking statute by (1) concluding 
that one ~f the numerous incidents of stalking occurred indimt!J between 
Barnes and Carson's coworkers on Carson's leased properry, and (2) 
concluding that the business relationship between Carson and Barnes did 
not justify or excuse Barnes' unreasonable actions? 
PRESERVATION: 'fhis issue was preserved through the arguments of counsel during the 
trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews for correctness a challenge to the legal 
determination that a person engaged in a "course of conduct" constituting stalking. Judd v. 
InJine, 2015 UT App 238, ,r 8, -- P.3d - (September 17, 2015), dting Bott v. Osborn, 2011 UT 
App 139, ,r 5, 257 P.3d 1022. When a defendant to a stalking injunction does not alert the 
district court to any perceived deficiencies in the adequacy of the findings, this Court will 
address the remaining claims as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
factual findings that support the granting of a civil stalking injunction. Id.; see Sheeran v. 
Thomas, 2014 UT App 285, ,r 8 n. 3,340 P.3d 797. 
RESTATED ISSUE #2: Did the trial court proper/y afford further relief pur.want to UTAH CODE G 
ANN. §77-3a-101 (5)(a)(iv) by restricting Barnes' abiliry to own or carry 
a firearm when one of the stalking inddents included Barnes brandishing 
and pointing a firearm at Carson's coworkers and ordering them from to 
leave Carson's leased properry? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved during the evidentiary hearing in this matter. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, 
we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made."' State v. Lar.ren, 2000 UT App 106, 999 P.2d 1252, dting Spanfrh 
rork Ci!J v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, iJs, 975 P.2d 501. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Pursuant to UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(6), Appellant sets forth the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations whose interpretation is determinative 
of or of central importance to this appeal: 
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A. UTAH CODE ANN. §53-SA-102 states as follows: 
(4) All authority to regulate firearms is reserved to the state except where the 
Legislature specifically delegates responsibility to local authorities or state 
entities. 
(5) Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local authority 
or state entity may not enact, establish, or enforce any ordinance, regulation, 
rule, or policy pertaining to firearms that in any way inhibits or restricts the 
possession or use of firearms on either public or private property. 
B. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.S(b): 
"Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific 
person, including: (i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, 
photographs, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or 
interferes with a person's property: (A) directly, indirectly, or through any 
third party; and (B) by any action, method, device, or means; or (ii) when the 
actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone else to engage in 
any of these acts: (A) approaches or confronts a person; (B) appears at the 
person's workplace or contacts the person's employer or coworkers; (C) 
appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's neighbors, or enters 
property owned, leased, or occupied by a person; (D) sends material by any 
means to the person or for the purpose of obtaining or disseminating 
information about or communicating with the person to a member of the 
person's family or household, employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the 
person; (E) places an object on or delivers an object to property owned, 
leased, or occupied by a person, or to the person's place of employment with 
the int~nt that the object be delivered to the person; or (F) uses a computer, 
the Internet, text messaging, or any other electronic means to commit an act 
that is a part of the course of conduct. 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101 (S)(a) states as follows: 
If the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of 
stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be issued by the 
court that includes any of the following: (i) respondent may be enjoined from 
committing stalking; (ii) respondent may be restrained from coming near the 
residence, place of employment, or school of the other party or specifically 
designated locations or persons; (iii) respondent may be restrained from 
contacting, directly or indirectly, the other party, including personal, written or 
telephone contact with the other party, the other party's employers, 
employees, fellow workers or others with whom communication would be 
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likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the other party; or (iv) any other relief 
necessary or convenient for the protection of the petitioner and other 
specifically designated persons under the circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 7, 2014, the Reqttest for Civil Stalking lf!Jitnction ("Request") was filed. 
R0001. This Request indicated that Barnes had been following Carson and causing issues on 
the property that he was renting from Barnes. R0003. Barnes was served with the Request 
on November 14, 2014. R0020. A Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction ("Temporary 
Injunction") was filed on November 13, 2014. R0014. An evidentiary hearing regarding 
the Request and Temporary Injunction was held on February 11, 2015. R0030. The Civil 
Stalking Injundion ("Injunction") was entered on March 5, 2015. R0048. Under the 
Injunction, Barnes was to not contact or stalk Carson and was to stay away from him. 
R0051. Barnes was also prohibited from carrying or owning a firearm. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. Evidentiary Hearing February 11, 2015 
A. Testimony of Stewart Burgess 
Stewart Burgess ("Stewart") testified he is a mining consultant. R0065:10. He 
testified he was helping Carson do some research and with some mineral projects on 
Carson's leased property. Id. Stewart testified he did not know Barnes until Barnes showed 
up on the property while Stewart was working there. Id. Stewart first met Barnes when he 
started a new project and was running some material with Carson. R0065:11. Stewart 
testified that Barnes showed up and thereafter the keys were missing from the generator; 
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then Barnes later showed up with the keys. Id. When Barnes returned, Carson showed him 
around the property but Stewart did not speak to Barnes on that occasion. Id. Stewart 
testified his wife Crystal was also present. Id. Barnes returned later, upset that the gates 
leading to the property were not shut and locked. R0065:12. 
Stewart was working at the property with Carson at the end of October of 2014 
running materials. Id. Carson had left the property at approximately 2:00 p.m. to pick up his 
boys. Id. Stewart testified that he and Crystal stayed to work on their project, and that 
Barnes showed up on the property as the sun was going down. R0065:13. Barnes walked 
around the property and building and then asked where Carson was, and they informed him 
that Carson had gone to Tooele. Id. Barnes then told them to get off the property 
immediately and would not give them any time to lock up the building or their equipment. 
Id. Stewart testified that Barnes asked them where the locks to the gate were, and Stewart 
replied they were located in Stewart's car. Id. Stewart and his wife gave him the locks and 
asked Barnes if he was going to lock them in. Id. Stewart testified that Barnes returned to his 
vehicle, pulled out a gun, loaded it and pointed it at them point blank range and told them to 
leave. R0065:14. Stewart and his wife quickly left, calling Carson who called the police. Id. 
Stewart testified he feared for his safety during such incident. R0065:15. 
Stewart testified he saw Barnes one more time around November 3, 2014, when they 
went to move their equipment and help Carson move his equipment off the property. 
R0065: 16. While helping Carson move, Stewart testified that Barnes showed up and parked 
across the way, so they called the police right away. Id. Stewart testified that Barnes got right 
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in Carson's face. R0065:17. When the Sheriff arrived, they discovered Barnes had locked 
them in the property, so Stewart and Carson had to go let the Sheriff in. Id. The police 
handled it from there and filed criminal charges against Barnes. Id. 
Stewart testified that he knew Barnes was the landlord and that Barnes was 
concerned with shutting and locking the gates on the property. R0065:19. Stewart did not 
know if the lease addressed whether the gates had to be locked while on the property, but 
that he always locked the gates when he left the property. R0065:21. Stewart's wife placed 
the gate locks in their car because Carson informed them to take the locks and put them in 
their car so that Barnes would not lock them in. Id. Stewart was not aware that Carson was 
not leasing the property were the gates were located. Id. 
B. Testimony of Crystal Burgess 
Crystal Burgess ("Crystal") testified she works with Stewart and Carson. R.0065:25. 
She testified that in October of 2014 they were working with Carson. Id. Carson left the 
property to pick up his boys, and Crystal and Stewart stayed to finish the project and head 
home. Id. Carson told them to get the locks off the gates about half an hour after he left, so 
they did. Id. 
Barnes showed up and after walking around the property asked where Carson was, 
and they told him Carson had left. R0065:26. Barnes immediately told them to get out. Id. 
They told him they would clean up and leave; however, Barnes demanded the locks and told 
them to leave now. Id. Crystal testified that they were confused about which locks he was 
talking about because there were many locks (to the building, equipment, gates, etc.), but 
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eventually showed him the locks were in their car. R0065:27. Barnes asked if they wanted 
him to call the Sheriff, and they said "yes"; however, Barnes instead left Stewart and Crystal 
and obtained a gun from his own car. Id. Barnes came back, loaded the gun and pointed it at 
Stewart's head. Id. They gave him the locks and left. Id. 
Stewart and Crystal saw Barnes one more time about a week later when they helped 
Carson move out. R0065:28. Barnes showed up and walked right up to Carson and got in his 
face. Id. Barnes then followed them around while they were packing up, and he was taking 
pictures of them and things. Id. Crystal was carrying a firearm on November 3 because she 
feared for her life after the previous incident. Id. 
They did not pay Carson any fee to work on the property out there. R0065:29. At the 
November 3 incident, Crystal vaguely recalled that Carson told Barnes that if he was younger 
he would "whoop his butt"; however, she did not see that as an actual threat. Id. She did not 
know if the property which Carson leased included the gates or not. R0065:31. 
C. Testimony of Timothy Carson 
Timothy Carson ("Carson") identified the lease agreement as his under his company, 
·rcM Bertha. R0065:36. He testified that Randy Hunt is listed as the landlord on the lease. 
R0065:37. Carson testified that Barnes became the landlord after purchasing the property. Id. 
Carson testified to the property area that was included in his lease. Id. Carson 
testified there were two (2) gates on the property: one by the highway and one by the 
railroad track. R0065:40. Barnes had purchased the locks, and the relator left him a key for 
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the locks out by the highway under a rock. R0065:41. Barnes did not personally give the key 
to Carson. Id. 
Carson had no idea who Barnes was and did not know he would be coming to the 
property on October 27, 2014. R0065:43. Carson first met Barnes when his keys to the 
generator went missing and he could not figure out who took them. R.0065:44. Carson 
testified he began to fear for his safety after the incident with Stewart and Crystal because he 
thought Barnes was unstable. Id Carson could not operate his business on the property due 
to Barnes' interference. Id. After the gun incident with Barnes against the Crystal and 
Stewart, Carson wanted to start moving his business property off the leased land 
immediately. R0065:46. However, he could not move the items immediately because it was 
such heavy equipment that moving it required use of a forklift, and he could not obtain a 
forklift for a few days. Id. 
Carson testified he was able to start moving things on November 3. Id. Steve, 
Randy, Crystal, and Stewart where there helping him move. R0065:4 7. While they were 
moving, Barnes showed up without any notice that he was going to be there that day. Id. 
Upon his arrival, Barnes got right in Carson's face, and Carson told Barnes that what he did 
was ridiculous. R0065:49. Carson testified that Barnes did not want a confrontation so he 
called the police. Id. When the police arrived, they called and said could not get in because 
the gates were locked. Id. Carson testified that it took a bit of time to get the gates unlocked 
so the police could come in. Id. 
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Carson was later informed that that Barnes would be charged with aggravated assault 
based upon the October 27 incident. R0065:50. Carson testified he feared for his safety 
from Barnes. Id. 
He last saw Barnes on either November 6, 2014, or November 9, 2014, when he was 
stopped in construction and saw Barnes pull in front of him. R0065:52. Carson did not want 
to block traffic with his trailer in the construction, so he went into Stockton; however, 
Barnes passed them, so he went to turn onto Skyline to come back into town. Id. Carson 
saw Barnes pull into the Hampton Inn, go to the other entrance and then turn out to follow 
him. R0065:53. 
Carson testified he headed to his property on Seventh Street with Barnes following 
him. Id. He testified Barnes stopped and turned off his lights. Id. Carson had the police on 
the line the entire time. R0065:54. Carson testified again the he feared for his safety. 
R0065:55. 
Carson and his brother dropped their trailers off at Carson's other shop in Tooele. 
Id. After he dropped off his trailer, Carson turned onto his street and saw Barnes' Bronco 
driving past his house slowly. R0065:56. Carson turned around to follow Barnes and called 
dispatch. R0065:57. Carson testified he again feared for his safety. Id. Carson believed he 
had called the police ten to fifteen (10-15) times because of incidents with Barnes. 
R0065:58. 
There was nothing in the lease agreement to indicate that Carson had to keep the 
gates locked while he was on the property. R0065:65. Further, Barnes never gave him 
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notice for when he was going to come on the property. Id. Carson testified that he would 
not feel safe without a stalking injunction in place. R.0065:66. 
Carson testified that TCM Bertha was his company. R0065:83. He did not threaten 
Barnes but told Barnes that if he had been present when he pulled the gun on the Burgesses, 
it would have been a different story. R0065:87. Carson was afraid Barnes would hurt his 
kids and wife. Id. He did not tell Barnes that if he were a younger man he would "whoop his 
butt." R0065:89. 
Carson moved his business property from the leased land to other property. 
R0065:90. Carson had not ever blocked Barnes' access from the property. R0065:91. 
Carson's truck was temporarily parked across the road when he was moving, but there was 
another exit off the property. Id. 
It was presented that the lease does not state that Barnes had to give notice to Carson 
to come on the property, and the lease also does not state that the gates had to be locked. 
R0065:98. Carson testified that he always locked up when he left the property. R0065:100. 
Carson testified he never agreed with Barnes to lock the property while he was using it. Id. 
Carson called the police to help keep the peace when dealing with Barnes. R.0065: 102. 
D. Testimony of Tom Barnes 
Tom Barnes ("Barnes") testified that he is an investment facilitator. R0065:114. He 
takes companies in trouble and cleans them up. Id. Barnes worked through relator Steve 
Griffiths to obtain the property at issue in this case. R.0065:116. He bought two (2) different 
properties in Tooele. Id. 
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Barnes testified that he sent Carson a letter about where to pay rent, and that he 
needed an estoppel certificate about three (3) weeks after closing. R0065:118. He testified 
that by the time Carson moved, he had already hired counsel for an eviction proceeding and 
drove by Carson's house to get his address to serve him. R0065:119. He testified he already 
had Carson's address since it was listed on rent checks, but he wanted to verify that it was 
correct. Id. 
Barnes testified that he followed Carson and saw Carson turn into his house, so 
Barnes just kept driving past; however, Carson saw him and followed him for a while, 
getting up close to him and then pulling back. Id. 
Barnes went to the property while Carson was moving and took pictures because 
Barnes thought the equipment they were moving should be left with the property. 
R.0065:120. Barnes testified that he went to leave and Carson blocked him in with his trailer. 
Id. He testified that you could not go around to any other entrance unless it was through the 
pasture, and there was a big drop off there. Id. Barnes testified he locked the gates on the 
way in and would have unlocked them if he knew that Carson was going to call the police. 
R.0065:121. 
Barnes followed Carson because he did not think Carson had reported the property 
he had on the premises to the Tooele County Tax assessor, and he did not want to have to 
pay the tax as the landowner. R.0065:122-23. Barnes testified he also followed him to see 
where he was taking the property. Id. Barnes was worried about the tailings left on the 
property polluting the water on the property. R.0065:126. 
l l 
Barnes testified he never threatened Carson, but that Carson threatened him. 
R0065:127. This happened on November 4, 2014, while Carson was moving his business 
property off the leased land, when Carson told him that if he was younger he would "whip 
his butt." Id. Barnes testified that he never poked Carson in the chest as he had no reason 
to do this. Id. 
Barnes testified that on October 27, 2014, around 7:00 p.m., he and his wife saw 
lights on the property from their hotel, so they went to check it out. R.0065:128. Barnes 
testified the gate was not locked and a man and a woman he did not recognize were present 
on the property. Id. Barnes asked them where the locks were. Id. Stewart and Crystal had 
locked them in their car. Id. Barnes assumed this meant they were not going to give them to 
him. R.0065:129. It was dark and when Barnes asked for the gate keys Crystal walked to her 
side of the car. Id. Barnes testified he started thinking Crystal and Stewart were there illegally 
and became concerned for his wife's safety since he did not know what Crystal was getting 
out of her vehicle. Id. 
Barnes testified that he went to his own vehicle and got his gun, and then Stewart and 
Crystal gave him the locks. R.0065:130. Barnes testified he did not put a bullet in the 
chamber or point the gun at them. Id. Barnes testified that he had never fired that gun, but 
has firearm training and had maintained a concealed handgun license for eight (8) years. 
R.0065:131. After Crystal and Stewart left, Barnes called Carson and got his voicemail. Id. 
Barnes then locked the gates and left. R.0065:132. Barnes was criminally charged for the 
incident, but took a plea in abeyance to a misdemeanor. R.0065:133. 
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Barnes contacted the police on many occasions. R0065:135. Neither gate was on 
Carson's leased property. R0065:137. Barnes testified he never gave Carson notice he was 
coming on the property. R0065:141. The property is only accessible on a gravel road. 
R0065:142. Barnes had to go thirty feet to his vehicle to get his gun when talking to Stewart 
and Crystal. R0065:144. He did not know what Crystal would pull out of her car. 
R0065:146. 
Barnes testified he did take the keys to the generator by clipping the cable that 
attached the keys to the generator. R0065:149. He took them to keep them from getting 
stolen since they were just sitting there attached to a cable. R0065:150. Barnes testified the 
keys should not just sit there with no one out there, and he thought he was doing Carson a 
favor. Id. He returned them to Carson the next day. Id. 
E. Trial Court's Oral Findings, Conclusions and Orders 
At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court indicated its concern about the 
acts that had occurred. R0065:172. The trial court was concerned that Barnes had taken the 
keys to the generator since they were not his property. Id. The trial court acknowledged 
Barnes' rights to enter and inspect as the landlord of the property, but found that Barnes' 
numerous appearances were beyond the scope of the reasonable right to inspect the 
property afforded him under the lease. R0065:172. 
The trial court determined that Barnes had seen Stewart and Crystal before-
referring to the time that Barnes came and took the generator keys and later returned them 
as testified to by Stewart-and that they had a legitimate right to be on the property as 
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permittees who were there to benefit Carson as the tenant. Id The court determined that 
the testimony of Stewart and Crystal was more credible than that of Barnes. Id. 
The trial court determined that Barnes had brandished a weapon and that he pled 
guilty through a plea in abeyance to a charge of reckless endangerment. R0065:173. The 
trial court determined that Barnes had confronted or approached Carson on the property 
and that he had also approached or contacted the Burgesses who were coworkers of Carson 
on the property. R0065:174. The trial court also found that Barnes had no reason to drive 
by Carson's residence since the address was already on the check. Id. Court also determined 
there was no reason for him to follow Carson in his vehicle. R0065: 17 5. The court found 
that a course of conduct on more than two (2) occasions had been established and that 
Carson reasonably feared for his safety, the safety of his wife and children and that stalking 
had been established. Id. The Court ordered that the Injunction should continue and 
should include a restriction on owning or possessing a firearm. Id. The restriction on 
firearms was justified where Barnes had previously brandished a firearm. R0065:176. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Barnes argues that this matter is a based on a matter of statutory interpretation. 
However, this argument is incorrect. Rather than a need for defining "directed to", which is 
sufficiently dealt with in the code itself, the question is whether the trial court properly 
concluded that Barnes had undertaken a "course of conduct" as that phrase is statutorily 
defined. Barnes complains that the trial court failed to explain itself, but did not properly 
raise a post-judgment motion seeking additional findings, thus the remainder of the issue can 
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only be reviewed as a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to whether the Injunction should 
have been issued with the perimeters contained therein. However, Barnes has failed to abide 
the requirements of UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) by marshaling the evidence in this regard. 
Instead, Barnes specifically avoids the evidence that supports the trial court's conclusion, and 
in essence attempts to reargue his trial position before this Court. The procedural issues 
should prevent this Court from even considering the merits of his issues. 
Alternatively, Barnes improperly interprets the statutory language by arguing that the 
elements of the stalking statute require only a course of conduct specifically directed at 
Carson and no one else, attempting to minimize the trespassing and gun brandishing 
incident caused by Barnes against Carson's coworkers. Barnes' appeal fails to adequately 
credit Stewart and Crystal's testimony although the trial court specifically credited them in its 
determination below. Barnes' entire argument is dependent upon ignoring these portions of 
the statute and this evidence that was presented. However, the trial court's findings were 
properly within the perimeters of the stalking statute, and supported by significant evidence. 
Thus, the elements of the stalking statute were met. 
Barnes' further argues that the Injunction's restriction on his ownership and carrying 
of a firearm is a violation of his Second Amendment rights. Barnes believes that he should 
be allowed to protect himself in whatever means he desires, whether reasonable or not. Even 
after being charged and entering a plea in abeyance to Reckless Endangerment over the 
incident, Barnes continues to argue that he should suffer no consequence to his right to own 
or carry a firearm. Barnes continually fails to realize that his behavior and actions, one 
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incident which specifically involved brandishing a gun at Stewart and Crystal, invoked fear of 
safety in Carson, Crystal and Stewart. Stewart and Crystal specifically decided to carry a gun 
during future visits of Carson's leased property. Barnes cites the right to bear arms, claiming 
there are no restrictions that apply to him; however, this ignores the provision of the stalking 
statute authorizing the trial court to enter any other relief necessary for the safety and 
protection of Carson and others. Where Barnes' actions included a firearm, the trial court 
was justified in specifically including a firearm restriction against Barnes. 
Barnes' unreasonable behaviors in following Carson, driving by his home, appearing 
at the leased property on numerous occasions without notice, photographing Carson and his 
crew as they were removing Carson's property from the leased land, and accosting Carson's 
coworkers on the leased land by pointing a firearm at them and ordering them off of 
Carson's leased property, all caused Carson to fear for his safety, particularly because it 
shows that Barnes' behavior is unpredictable. Thus, Barnes Second Amendment rights were 
not violated since it is his own actions and behavior that led to the appropriate consequence 
of the gun restriction. Thus, this Court should affirm the Injunction. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
BARNES HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY RAISE A CHALLENGE TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS UPON WHICH HIS 
ARGUMENTS RELY, AND HE HAS FURTHER FAILED TO MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UT. R. APP. P. 24(A)(9); HENCE, THIS COURT 
SHOULD THUS DECLINE TO REACH THE MERITS OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED. 
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UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states in pertinent part that, "[a] party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." In State 
v. Nielsen it discusses the marshaling requirement as follows: 
[A]n appellant who seeks to prevail in challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a factual finding or a verdict on appeal should follow the 
dictates of rule 24(a)(9), as a party who fails to identify and deal with 
supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under 
the deferential standard of review that applies to such issues. 
Ibid., 2014 UT 10, iJ40, 326 P.3d 645. A comprehensive analysis of the marshaling 
requirement and its purposes on appeal is discussed as follows: 
[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent 
excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing court. The marshaling 
process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate 
himself or herself from the client's shows and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to property discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, 
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate 
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ,I 21, 217 P.3d 733, quoting West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)(emphasis in original). "The marshaling 
requirement is not satisfied if parties just list all the evidence presented at trial, or simply 
rehash the arguments on evidence they presented at trial." Id., citing Nee/y v. Bennett, 2002 UT 
App 189, ,I 12, 51 P.3d 724, cert. denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
On appeal, this court is "limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and 
may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence ... " Bailey v. Bqyles, 2002 UT 58, ,I 20, 52 P .3d 
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1158. More recently this Court has reiterated that, "an appellate court's role is not to reweigh 
the evidence presented at trial but only to determine whether the court's decision is 
supported by the evidence, leaving questions of credibility and weight to the trial court." 
Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ~ 24, 334 P.3d 994, citing Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT 
App 233, ~ 20 n. 5, 217 P.3d 733 ("No matter what contrary facts might have been found 
from all the evidence, our deference to the trial court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder 
requires us to take the findings of fact as our starting point, unless particular findings have 
been shown ... to lack legally adequate evidentiary support."). 
Barnes' Opening Brief contains two issues, which can be summed up as (1) the 
Injunction was wrongly entered because one of the incidents was not "directed at" Carson 
and the other incidents of Barnes' actions were authorized by the lease; and (2) the trial court 
erred in unlawfully restricting Barnes' right to own and carry a firearm. Although Barnes 
claims the first issue to be one of "statutory interpretation and application", he is mistaken. 
The argument is instead towards the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing that 
supports the specific statutory elements. Barnes believes the actions taken by Barnes against 
Stewart and Crystal were not "directed at" Carson as it pertains to the application of the 
stalking statute, and that he is thus absolved of it being a stalking incident under such statute. 
Barnes fails to recognize this issue as fact-dependent and based upon facts that Barnes 
disputed below and here on the appeal once again. R0065:172. 
Barnes fails to acknowledge the court's findings that Barnes knew Crystal and Stewart 
were coworkers of Carson, having previously seen them with Carson on the property prior 
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to Barnes' gun brandishing incident. R0065:172. These facts are vital to Barnes' argument 
since he claimed he did not know them, thought they were trespassers, and feared for his 
own safety-all excuses he gave the trial court for his improper brandishing of the gun. 
R0065:129. Ironically, the trial court found Barnes to have been exceeding his authority in 
entering the property under the lease, with this incident being an obvious example. 
R0065:172. Hence, in order for Barnes to make the argument that his actions were not 
"directed at" Carson under the stalking statute, not only would he have to show that he was 
lawfully on the property at that time, he had to show that he was unaware Stewart and 
Crystal were coworkers of Carsons. The testimony before the trial court, and the trial court's 
own findings, contravene this position. 
If Barnes' argument truly was one of statutory interpretation, it would require that he 
accept the facts as they are; however, Barnes continues to dispute the facts on appeal as he 
did below, without properly raising any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Barnes' 
argument in his brief relies on his factual position that, "Mr. Barnes had good reason, given 
the prevailing circumstances on October 27, to fear for his and his wife's safety. It was dark, 
the couple refused to turn over the locks to the gates, and the woman reached into her car 
without declaring her purpose in doing so." See, ibid. at Argument I, p. 14. Not only does 
Barnes ignore the actual findings here, but Barnes own "Statement of the Case" fails to 
recite the evidence adduced from Crystal and Stewart's testimonies that Barnes actually 
pointed the gun directly at them, a gun which by Barnes' own testimony he took time to 
retrieve from 30 feet away in his vehicle. R0065:14,27,144. The trial court rightfully credited 
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Stewart and Crystal's testimonies. R0065:172. Barnes' issue is entirely against the trial court's 
unchallenged findings and is made in nothing more than an attempt to reargue his position 
from below under guise of a statutory interpretation argument. However, Barnes cannot 
alter the facts to make his argument that it was not "directed at" Carson. 
Further, Barnes argues that his landlord-tenant relationship with Carson excuses his 
behavior. Barnes' brief cites that their business relationship had not gone well because of 
Carson's actions-Carson repeatedly refused to lock the gates and provide proof of 
insurance and a proper estoppel certificate. Ibid. at pp. 16-17. Barnes further argues that the 
events of November 4 and 6 were "merely carrying out his responsibilities as landlord." Id. at 
p. 17. During one of these incidents, Barnes claims he believed Carson was stealing 
equipment that belonged to the property, so he followed him, but for some reason only 
followed him for about "a mile." See Opening Brief at p. 17. Barnes fails to cite Carson's 
testimony that paints a significantly different picture of this incident. Carson testified that, 
when he was stopped in construction, he saw Barnes pull in front of him. R0065:52. Carson 
redirected his route and went into Stockton only to see Barnes pass them again, so Carson 
went back into town. Id. Carson then observed Barnes pull into the Hampton Inn only to 
the other entrance and then exit once again following Carson. R0065:53. Carson headed to 
his property on Seventh Street, and Barnes followed, then stopped and turned off his lights. 
Id. Thereafter, Carson turned onto his own residential street and saw Barnes' Bronco driving 
slowly past his house. R0065:56. According to Barnes, however, these actions were "merely 
carrying out his responsibilities as landlord." Id. at p. 17. 
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Barnes notes that, "[t]he district court did reject Mr. Barnes' explanation for driving 
by Mr. Carson's residence, noting that he had Mr. Carson's address 'on the check"'; 
however, Barnes' Opening Brief then goes on to explain why he does not agree with this 
finding, never having properly challenged it in the appeal. Ibid. at p. 18. Barnes argues "[b]ut 
addresses on checks are often outdated" and then he tries to charge Carson with trying to 
keep his address secret. J d. This incident occurred within approximately one (1) week after 
the gun brandishing incident with Stewart and Crystal; however, Barnes does not believe 
Carson reasonably feared for his or his family's safety based on these actions undertaken by 
Barnes. 
At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court indicated its concern about the 
acts that had occurred. R0065:172. The trial court found that Barnes had no reason to drive 
by Carson's residence since the address was already on his check. Id. The trial court also 
determined there was no reason for him to follow Carson in his vehicle. R0065:175. Barnes 
did not file any post-judgment motion seeking clarification of these findings, and does not 
challenge them on appeal other than to say that the trial court did not explain them to his 
liking. See, Opening Brief at p. 17. 
As to Barnes' second argument regarding the trial court depriving him of his ability to 
carry and own a gun under the Injunction, the same procedural problems perpetuate from 
his first argument. Barnes raises this issue as a deprivation of constitutional rights; however, 
his argument refuses once again to accept the trial court's findings that he fails to challenge 
on appeal, citing a different position similar to the one he raised that was rejected below. 
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While making much of federal law and the constitutional rights to bear arms, Barnes makes 
the mistake of indicating that "[n]othing in the Federal or Utah law allows Mr. Barnes' right 
to own and carry firearms to be restricted under the circumstances permitted here." See, 
Opening Brief at Argument II, p. 21 (emphasis added). The error in this argument is that 
Barnes does not accept the "circumstances" as found by the trial court, refusing entirely to 
accept the trial court's findings that he brandished a weapon at Stewart and Crystal, 
specifically taking the time to leave what Barnes perceived as a threat in order to retrieve the 
gun from his vehicle 30 feet away, and return to point the gun at Stewart and Crystal. He 
argues that the trial court's rightful exercise of discretion under the stalking statute in placing 
a restriction on his right to own or carry a gun was error because "[i]t does not matter that 
one of the incidents described at the hearing involved a firearm." See, Opening Brief at p. 22. 
Barnes argues that his plea in abeyance in criminal court was a sufficient consequence; 
however, this argument ignores the trial court's finding that this incident along with 
numerous others led Carson to reasonably fear for his safety, the safety of his wife and 
children. R0065: 17 5. The plea in abeyance was insufficient to address the safety issues. 
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) required Barnes to marshal all record evidence supporting any 
challenged finding. Instead of abiding this procedure, Barnes seeks to have this Court adopt 
different findings simply based on Barnes' disagreement with them. Had Barnes properly 
challenged the findings he takes issue with in his Opening Bri~f, and properly marshaled the 
evidence under Rule 24(a)(9), fully embracing the devil's advocate position, he would have 
realized that what he mistakenly perceived as "fatal flaws" in the trial court's decision were 
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actually significantly supported by the evidence. Kimball at ,I 21, quoting Majestic at 1315. This 
is one of the purposes of marshaling: to require the advocate of sufficiency challenges to 
"extricate himself or herself from the client's shows and fully assume the adversary's 
position" and see it from the perspective against which they fought and lost already below. 
Id. As noted above, the findings that Barnes ignores or attempts to alter through arguments 
not specifically raised under a proper sufficiency challenge are adequately supported by the 
record and rest upon sound evidence. Id. Barnes has simply fallen into the trap that so many 
do on appeal by simply trying to rehash the arguments on evidence he presented at trial, 
which does not meet the procedural requirements of the appellate rules. Id., citing Nee!J at 1 
12, cert. denied, 59 P.3d 603; Rule 24(a)(9). 
Since Barnes has failed to identify and deal with the supportive evidence under the 
standard set by Rule 24(a)(9), and has failed to raise any challenge to the findings that he 
attempts to circumvent, this Court should decline to reach the merits of his issues. Nielsen at 
,I40. Had Barnes marshaled the evidence appropriately, he would have recognized the 
sufficient evidence on the record that supported them. Instead, he raises issues entirely 
dependent upon this Court adopting Barnes' own desired findings that contravene the trial 
court's findings. However, this court is limited to the trial court's findings, particularly where 
they are not specifically challenged on appeal. Bailey at ,I 20. This Court cannot reweig~ the 
evidence and give more weight to the relationship between Barnes and Carson under the 
lease when the trial court found Barnes' actions were not excused under the lease, to name 
but only one instance where Barnes seeks reweighing. Id. Further, it is improper for Barnes 
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to ask this Court to alter the trial court's finding that Stewart and Crystal's version of events 
during Barnes' brandishing of the gun was more credible than Barnes' version of the events. 
Barrani at ,I 24, citing Kimball at ,I 20 n. 5. The trial court is the forum well suited to determine 
matters of credibility being in the presence of the witnesses during their testimonies. This 
Court's deference to the trial court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder requires that 
determination of Barnes' issues on appeal begin with the trial court's findings of fact, 
particularly since they are unchallenged in this appeal and are adequately supported by 
evidence below. Kimball at 1 20 n. 5. 
The trial court found that Stewart and Crystal's testimonies were credible and that ~i 
Barnes had brandished and pointed a gun at them in an unreasonable fashion, invoking fear 
in them. The trial court found that Barnes' actions in coming to the property unannounced 
so frequently, like he did when he had the encounter with Stewart and Crystal, were 
excessive and unreasonable under the lease. The trial court found that Barnes was not 
reasonable in following Carson or driving by his home. The trial court found that these 
actions had reasonably made Carson fear for his and his family's safety. None of these 
having been properly challenged, and these findings being adequately supported by the 
record dictate that this Court should decline to address the merits of Barnes' issues that are 
wholly dependent upon different findings than those from the Injunction proceedings 
below. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE 
CIVIL STALKING STATUTE BY CONCLUDING THAT ONE OF THE 
NUMEROUS INCIDENTS OF STALKING OCCURRED BETWEEN 
BARNES AND CARSON'S COWORKERS, AND FURTHER BY 
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CONCLUDING THAT THE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
CARSON AND BARNES DID NOT JUSTIFY OR EXCUSE BARNES' 
ACTIONS. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.5(1)(6) and (2) discuss the "course of conduct" as it is 
defined in the stalking statute as follows: 
"Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific 
person, including: (i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, 
photographs, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or 
interferes with a person's property: (A) directly, indirectly, or through any 
third party; and (B) by any action, method, device, or means; or (ii) when the 
actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone else to engage in 
any of these acts: (A) approaches or confronts a person; (B) appears at the 
person's workplace or contacts the person's employer or coworkers; C) 
appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's neighbors, or enters 
property owned, leased, or occupied by a person; (D) sends material by any 
means to the person or for the purpose of obtaining or disseminating 
information about or communicating with the person to a member of the 
person's family or household, employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the 
person; (E) places an object on or delivers an object to property owned, 
leased, or occupied by a person, or to the person's place of employment with 
the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or (F) uses a computer, 
the Internet, text messaging, or any other electronic means to commit an act 
that is a part of the course of conduct. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages in a 
course of conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should know 
that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person: (a) to fear for 
the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or (b) to suffer other 
emotional distress. 
In Coombs v. Dietrich the stalking statute is discussed in more detail as follows: 
We, however, do not read the plain language of the Stalking Statute to require 
that each act or incident independently be such as to cause a reasonable 
person to fear for his or her safety; rather, it is the pattern of behavior or the 
course of conduct considered in the context of the circumstances that must 
have that cumulative effect. See general!J Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, ,r,r 
25-33, 136 P.3d 1242 (reasoning that because "[s]talking, by its very nature, is 
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an offense of repetition," the "conduct is rendered ... more threatening 
because it is repeated" and should not be considered in a vacuum; thus, the 
conduct at issue should be considered cumulatively "in the context of the facts 
and circumstances of the individual case"); see also National Ctr. for Victims of 
Crime, The Model Stalking Code Revisited, p. 39 (2007) (providing that "[t]he 
seriousness of stalking behavior often escalates over time," thus the model 
stalking code "recommends a general fear requirement that would address 
conduct that may lead to more violent acts in the future" in contrast to more 
stringent requirements that "may impede timely intervention"). 
Ibid., 2001 UT App. 136,113,253 P.3d 1121. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101(5)(a) sets forth 
the court's authority with regard to issuing stalking injunctions once the criteria has been 
met: 
If the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of 
stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be issued by the 
court that includes any of the follO\ving: (i) respondent may be enjoined from 
committing stalking; (ii) respondent may be restrained from coming near the 
residence, place of employment, or school of the other party or specifically 
designated locations or persons; (iii) respondent may be restrained from 
contacting, directly or indirectly, the other party, including personal, written or 
telephone contact with the other party, the other party's employers, 
employees, fellow workers or others with whom communication would be 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the other party; or (iv) any other relief 
necessary or convenient for the protection of the petitioner and other 
specifically designated persons under the circumstances. 
In his Appellee's Brief Barnes argues that the court has not met the elements as set 
forth in the stalking statute, specifically because Barnes' act of brandishing the weapon at 
Stewart and Crystal was not "directed at" Carson. Brief at p. 13. Therefore, Barnes argues 
that it did not meet the elements of the stalking statute. Barnes is mistaken in this argument 
as the trial court determined that the elements of the stalking statute had been met. 
The Court found that Stewart and Crystal were coworkers of Carson and, on October 
27, they were lawfully present on the leased property. Barnes had previously been known to 
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lock the gates while people were on the property, a few instances of which were testified to 
at the evidentiary hearing. Barnes had a rising anger over his mistaken perception that 
Carson was refusing to lock the gates as requested; however, Carson was locking them 
whenever he or the last worker left the property. Barnes apparently wanted them locked at 
all times and thus occasionally curtailed visitor's freedom of movement by locking them in. 
On October 27 after Carson left the property, he called and informed Stewart and Crystal to 
put the locks in their car so they could be assured that they would not be locked in by 
Barnes. 
Barnes knew or should have known Stewart and Crystal were coworkers of Carson, 
having previously seen them with Carson on the property and observed them working in a 
manner consistent with Carson's reasons to lease and work on the property. According to 
Stewart's testimony, Stewart was present when Carson showed Barnes around the property 
one time. In essence, the October 27 incident likely occurred because Barnes was upset 
when he found the gate locks missing, so he accosted Stewart and Crystal on the property he 
himself was not lawfully allowed to enter. With his escalating anger over such matters, 
Barnes then caused an entirely inappropriate confrontation with the innocent coworkers, 
brandishing his gun to intimidate them and kick them off property on which they were 
rightfully located, which further impeded their ability to accomplish the work for Carson that 
they were there to accomplish. 
Even if the incident involving brandishing a firearm against Stewart and Crystal never 
happened, the "other" incidents of stalking for which Barnes was held responsible support 
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the issuance of the stalking Injunction as well. Barnes followed Carson from the property on 
at least one occasion, unreasonably drove by Carson's home in a deliberate fashion to 
determine where he lived, unreasonably and repetitively appeared at Carson's workplace (the 
Property), accosted Carson and his coworkers, and took photographs of them removing 
Carson's business property when Carson was leaving the Property. Each of these incidents 
support the finding of stalking. However, it is important to note that these all happened qfter 
Barnes had brandished a gun at Stewart and Crystal. That threshold incident with the gun 
impacted all future actions taken by Barnes against Carson. 
The Opening Brief at Argument I(A) cites only a very small portion of the stalking 
statute, namely only the words "directed at", ignoring entirely the remaining portions of such 
statute. In fact, the only other "authority" listed in this argument is defining the terms 
"directed at" in the Black's Uw Dictionary. Barnes' argument fails to meet another criteria of 
Rule 24(a)(9) by failing to cite to authorities for his position other than taking two words out 
of context from the statute itself and defining them by use of a dictionary. This error is 
particularly egregious given that this Court's precedent on the subject, together with the 
remaining portions of the statute, support the trial court's determination below that the 
October 27 incident was a stalking incident against Carson. 
The Opening Brief at Argument I(B) Barnes claims his landlord position under the lease 
authorized his behavior since he "was merely carrying out his responsibilities as landlord." 
Ibid. at p. 17. Although he recognizes the trial court's rejection of his explanation for driving 
by Carson's home after the October 27 incident, he continues to argue in favor of it to try 
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and lead this Court to a different conclusion than that of the trial court, namely that Barnes 
was somehow justified in his stalking actions by the lease itself. Barnes entire Argument I(B) 
is spent defining what is "reasonable" from an "objective standard." Ibid. at pp. 16-17. 
However, the trial court itself specifically found that Barnes' actions were unreasonable 
under such a standard, and Barnes has not properly raised a challenge to that finding on 
appeal as set forth more particularly supra. 
Barnes' argument that his actions had to be "direct at" Carson ignores the entire 
definition provided in the code regarding what a "course of conduct" entails. Barnes does 
not even cite to or analyze the plethora of law on "course of conduct" with regard to 
stalking. Instead he reads it as having to be a direct action from him towards Carson. 
However, the "course of conduct" definition repeatedly contradicts Barnes' mistaken belief. 
It allows any and all actions considered to be stalking to be done "indirectly, or through any 
third party" UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(A). It also finds that stalking is supported 
if the guilty party "causes someone else to engage in any of these acts." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-5-106.S(l)(a)(ii). Direct action from the guilty party to the victim of stalking is not 
required under Utah law. 
Barnes is guilty of stalking because he intentionally or knowingly engaged in a "course 
of conduct" directed at Carson, and knew or should have known that his "course of 
conduct" would cause Carson to fear for his own safety or the safety of a third person, or 
suffer other emotional distress. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.5(2). The requirement of two 
(2) or more actions to rise to a "course of conduct" were easily met herein. The October 27 
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stalking incident was accomplished by Barnes unreasonably appearing at Carson's workplace 
(the Property) and not only contacting Carson's coworkers (Stewart and Crystal), but 
accosting them with his gun brandished and pointing at them, and absent any authority 
demanding that they leave the Property. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.S(l)(a)(ii)(B). This 
incident also separately met the criteria under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.S(l)(a)(ii)(C) for 
stalking since Barnes had unreasonably entered Carson's property that was leased by him. In 
fact, Barnes had repetitively entered Carson's leased property, and these were found by the 
trial court to be unreasonable in Barnes position as landlord, thus each action independently 
meeting the criteria for stalking under §76-5-106.S(l)(a)(ii)(C). Barnes had also taken 
photographs of Carson and his crew while they were moving Carson's business property 
from the leased land. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.S(l)(a)(i). At one point, Barnes followed 
Carson off the property and eventually to his residence, monitoring and observing and 
surveilling him, even suspiciously pulling his car over and turning off his lights. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-5-106.S(l)(a)(i). There were at least five (5) or more incidents of stalking, and 
Barnes' argument that it was all accomplished in his right as landlord was rightfully rejected 
by the trial court. 
Barnes fails to analyze the actual standard of stalking in his Opening Brief. Barnes 
argues each act independently of one another, indicating that some were not "directed at" 
Carson and that others should not have caused him to reasonably fear for his safety since it 
was just Barnes being the landlord. However, "it is the pattern of behavior or the course of 
conduct considered in the context of the circumstances that must have that cumulative 
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effect." Coombs at iJ13; see general!J Ellison at iJiJ 25-33. Most of the incidents which established 
the course of conduct occurred subsequent to the egregious gun brandishing at Carson's 
coworkers. Thereafter, whenever Barnes would appear unannounced on the property, follow 
Carson in his car, or drive by Carson's house, there was a fear that Barnes had his gun with 
him. Clearly, Barnes' anger regarding the gate locks had escalated into an unlawful show of 
force on October 27 against Carson's coworkers, resulting in Barnes' plea in abeyance to 
reckless endangerment. However, since it was a misdemeanor, Barnes' ability to continue 
owning and carrying a gun left Carson unprotected. 
Barnes had already unreasonably escalated a very minor thing (the gate locks) to a 
potentially violent act (brandishing the gun). Carson could reasonably believe Barnes would 
be willing to use that same show of force, or continue to escalate in his anger over the 
circumstances, particularly since Barnes was undertaking other actions considered to be 
stalking: photographing, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, etc. See, The Model 
Stalking Code Revisited, p. 39. Barnes actions were an offense of repetition, with his actions 
rendered more threatening because they were repeated and completed after an incident 
involving a gun. Ellison at iJiJ 25-33. Neither the October 27 nor any other incident should 
be considered in a vacuum, but rather in the proper cumulative manner adopted by this 
Court, applying a more general fear requirement to address Barnes' conduct that could lead 
to more violent acts in the future. Id; see The Model Stalking Code Revisited at p. 39. 
Given the cumulative effect of all of Barnes' actions, the trial court rightfully 
determined that Barnes should be subject to the stalking Injunction. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-
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3a-101(5)(a) authorized the trial court to enjoin Barnes from committing stalking, restrain 
him from coming near Carson's residence and place of employment or other specified 
locations, and restrain him from directly or indirectly contacting Carson or his fellow 
workers or any third parties that would cause annoyance or alarm to Carson. UT AH CODE 
ANN. §77-3a-101 (S)(a)(i)-(iii). Given that the stalking circumstances originated with Barnes 
unreasonably using his gun against Carson's coworkers, leading to his own criminal plea in 
abeyance to reckless endangerment, the trial court maintained authority to limit Barnes' 
ability to own or carry a gun under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101(5)(a)(iv) which allows 
"any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection of [Carson] and other ~ 
specifically designated persons under the circumstances." 
Should this Court determine to render a decision on the merits of Barnes position 
that the October 27 incident and other incidents did not rise to stalking, it should affirm the 
trial court's Injunction as appropriately rendered under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101 and 
§76-5-106.5. Barnes had at least five (5) stalking incidents, one of which included the use of a Gi 
weapon against those who are also protected under the stalking statute. The Injunction was 
proper. 
III. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ARGUMENT I SUPRA ON THIS ISSUE, IT 
WAS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT BARNES 
COULD NOT POSSESS A FIREARM FOR THREE (3) YEARS BASED 
UPON THE ISSUANCE OF THE INJUNCTION. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §53-SA-102 discusses firearms laws as follows: 
( 4) All authority to regulate firearms is reserved to the state except where the 
Legislature specifically delegates responsibility to local authorities or state 
entities. 
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(5) Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local authority 
or state entity may not enact, establish, or enforce any ordinance, regulation, 
rule, or policy pertaining to firearms that in any way inhibits or restricts the 
possession or use of firearms on either public or private property. 
This prohibition against restriction on firearms is aimed towards enactments of general 
regulations that would effectuate such restrictions on everyone. There are several exceptions 
provided by our Legislature that are considered on a case-by-case basis. 
In Her/and v. Izatt the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that, "the Legislature has 
expressed two important public policy points through the passage of various statutes: first, 
that firearms are not to be provided to individuals who are likely to harm others, ... ; second, 
that firearms cannot be carried under every circumstance, even if the gun owner has a 
concealed weapons permit." Ibid., 2015 UT 30, ,I23, 345 P.3d 661. "To further these 
policies, the Legislature has also made the criminal penalties applicable to firearms violations 
more severe than other dangerous weapon violations." Id. at ,I28; compare §76-10-
504(1 )( class B misdemeanor to carry a concealed dangerous weapon) with §76-10-504(2)-
(3)(class A misdemeanor or second degree felony to carry a concealed firearm or unlawfully 
possess a short-barreled shotgun or rifle). 
As an example of the Legislature's exercise of authority, UTAH CODE ANN. §53-5-704 
governs concealed carry permits in Utah and specifically lists circumstances in which a 
person's firearm permit may be denied, suspended or revoked, one of which includes 
conviction of a crime of violence. UTAH CODE ANN. §53-5-704(2)(ii). Under subsection 
(3)(a) contained therein, it also specifically states as follows: 
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The bureau may deny, suspend, or revoke a concealed firearm permit if it has 
reasonable cause to belief that the applicant or permit holder has been or is a 
danger to self or others as demonstrated by evidence, including: 
(i) past pattern of behavior involving unlawful violence or threats of 
unlawful violence; 
(ii) past participation in incidents involving unlawful violence or threats of 
unlawful violence; or 
(iii) conviction of an offense in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, 
Weapons. 
A further look at (3)(a)(iii) indicates that UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-506(2) pertains to 
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, specifically holding that 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 76-2-402 [force in defense of person] ... a person 
who, in the presence of two or more persons, and not amounting to a violation of Section 
7 6-5-103 [Aggravated Assault], draws or exhibits a dangerous weapon m an angry and 
threatening manner or unlawfully uses a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor." Under §76-2-402(2)(a)(i) and (iii), force in defense of person is not 
justified if the person initially provoked the use of force or was the aggressor. 
While Barnes was not convicted of this particular crime under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-10-506, its elements fit precisely into the one for which he was convicted. "A person 
commits reckless endangerment if, under the circumstances not amounting to a felony 
offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or 
serious bodily injury to another person." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-112(1). Reckless 
endangerment is also a class A misdemeanor. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-112(2). Reckless 
endangerment does not require that the conduct occur during a fight or quarrel; however, it 
is of the same level of crime as §76-10-506, being a class A misdemeanor. The differences in 
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these two crimes actually elevates Reckless Endangerment over threatening or using a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel. Barnes was charged and entered a plea in abeyance 
to a crime that evidences he did point the gun at Stewart and Crystal since he had to 
"create0 a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury" to them, rather than just 
drawing, exhibiting or unlawfully using it to intimidate during a fight or quarrel. Reckless 
Endangerment is a crime of violence. 
The stalking statute under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101(5)(a)(iv) provides that, "[i]f 
the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred, 
an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be issued by the court that includes any of the 
following: . . . (iv) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection of the 
petitioner and other specifically designated persons under the circumstances." 
In the Opening Brief, Barnes has argued that his Second Amendment right to bear arms 
is being violated by being restricted in his ability to own or carry a gun under the Injunction. 
Ibid. at 19. Barnes argues that "[t]he right to own and carry weapons, including firearms, is 
not without limits, but no such limits apply here." Id. Barnes believes that, "[n]othing in 
Federal or Utah law allows Mr. Barnes' right to own and carry firearms to be restricted under 
the circumstances presented here." Id. at p. 21. Barnes argues that he does not fall within any 
of the "restricted" categories contained in UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-503(1)(a), (b), (2), and 
(3). Id. at p. 22. Most egregious is Barnes contention that, "[i]t does not matter that one of 
the incidents described at the hearing involved a firearm." Id. 
35 
Barnes' rights to own and carry a gun are subject to restriction if "specifically 
authorized by the Legislature by statute." UTAH CODE ANN. §53-SA-102. Contrary to 
Barnes' recitation of the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms in general, our Utah 
Legislature and our Utah Supreme Court have expressed that firearms are not to be provided 
to individuals who are likely to harm others. Her/and at ,I23. Barnes entered a plea in 
abeyance to a violent crime against Stewart and Crystal, that of Reckless Endangerment. 
Although he indicates that the matter has since been dismissed, the Injunction issued March 
5, 2015, and the dismissal did not occur until June of 2015. See, Opening Brief at Addendum 
"C." Barnes has not sought to amend the Injunction or provided the trial court with any 
opportunity to consider such matters below. 
Barnes' excuse that he maintains a concealed carry permit is not dispositive of the 
question of whether he should still be allowed to own or carry a firearm after the stalking 
incidents herein. Her/and at iJ23. While Barnes pled to a misdemeanor charge that did not 
contain a firearm specification, the crime necessarily required that he have placed Stewart 
and Crystal in fear of death or severe bodily injury. Basically, that he pointed the firearm at 
them. The Legislature has repeatedly placed an emphasis on firearms violations as being 
more severe violations than other dangerous weapons. Her/and at iJ28. 
There are numerous instances of statutory authorization to support the trial court's 
Injunction restricting Barnes in this manner. Given the circumstances of this case, Barnes 
may be subject to denial, suspension or revocation of his concealed permit since he entered 
the plea in abeyance to the Reckless Endangerment charge. UTAH CODE ANN. §53-5-
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704(2)(ii). If it required an actual conviction for such provision to apply, the Legislature also 
enacted UTAH CODE ANN. §53-5-704(3)(a) to allow denial, suspension or revocation of his 
permit if he has a past pattern of behavior involving unlawful violence or threats of unlawful 
violence. The October 27 and the stalking incidents thereafter would be sufficient to meet 
the "unlawful violence" criteria or, at a minimum, "threats of unlawful violence" since 
stalking incidents are considered threatening in nature. UTAH CODE ANN. §53-5-704(3)(a)(i) 
The Legislature specifically authorizes restrictions to those who commit crimes 
involving threatening behavior or use of a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, 
specifically excepting force in defense of person for someone who initially provoked the use 
of force or was the aggressor. UTAH CODE ANN. §53-5-704(3)(a)(ili), §76-10-506(2), and 
§76-2-402(2)(a)(i) and (iii). Barnes came onto Carson's property angry that the gate locks 
were gone, accosted Stewart and Crystal making demands that they turn over the locks, then 
walked 30 feet to his car, got his gun, and instead of leaving he returned to point it at them, 
demanding they give him the locks and leave the property on which they were lawfully 
allowed to be-even though Barnes was not. Barnes was clearly the one initially provoking 
the use of force, and was the aggressor in the fight or quarrel with Stewart and Crystal. He 
used the firearm to intimidate them and force them to do what he wanted. This is precisely 
the type of circumstance the Legislature intended to include in authorizing a restriction for 
people like Barnes. 
While Barnes was not convicted of this particular crime under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-10-506, its elements are similar to Reckless Endangerment under UTAH CODE ANN. 
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§76-5-112(1); however, Reckless Endangerment required Barnes to create a substantial risk 
of death or serious bodily injury, while §76-10-506 only required that a dangerous weapon be 
drawn or exhibited while the holder is angry. The fact that Barnes did not just show the 
firearm, but specifically pointed it at Stewart and Crystal made the difference in the charges. 
Nonetheless, the stalking statute under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101(5)(a)(iv) 
provides that, "[i] f the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of 
stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be issued by the court that 
includes any of the following: ... (iv) any other relief necessary or convenient for the 
protection of the petitioner and other specifically designated persons under the 
circumstances." While Barnes believes his plea in abeyance was sufficient consequence for 
his behavior on October 27, such criminal procedure did not ensure Carson that he would 
be protected and feel safe from Barnes. The trial court specifically included the firearm 
restriction in the Injunction since the plea in abeyance was unsatisfactory for providing 
Carson the protection he needed. The trial court was well within its discretion to enter the 
order it did under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101(5)(a)(iv), contrary to Barnes assertion that 
neither Federal nor Utah law would support it. 
Barnes' Second Amendment rights have only been restricted and limited by the 
Injunction as a consequence of his own actions. Ibid. at 19. At the evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court specifically articulated its concern about the acts that had occurred in this case. 
R0065:172. Contrary to Barnes' assertion, limitations on his right to carry and own a firearm 
should apply in this matter. Barnes falls squarely within the legislative public policy point 
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that firearms should not be in the hands of those who would harm others with it. Barnes 
cannot hide behind his concealed weapons permit nor the Second Amendment when he 
believes that he can unlawfully enter onto another's property, pull his firearm and point it at 
people who are lawfully authorized to be there, and demand that they leave immediately, 
particularly when this behavior has escalated from something as unimportant as his 
preference on the gate being locked at all times. Thereafter, he then perpetuated such fear by 
following, observing, surveilling, and taking pictures of them, even driving by Carson's 
home. Barnes did not prioritize the lives of those around him, but instead wanted to 
intimidate through a show of violence, using his firearm to invoke fear and force others to 
do what he wanted them to do-to a legal extent amounting to fear of death or substantial 
bodily injury. The "protection" language of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-3a-101(5)(a)(iv) was 
created just for this purpose-to allow trial courts to look at the entire circumstances and 
enter orders that will keep the victims of stalking safe, particularly where no other provision 
and the criminal code cannot accomplish it (and Carson is not permitted to use the criminal 
code to pursue any protection or rights as those remedies belong to the State). This Court 
should affirm the trial court's Injunction, if for no other reason than to clearly communicate 
to Barnes that it really did matter that one of the stalking incidents involved a firearm, and 
that he cannot behave in this manner and be allowed to own or carry a firearm. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Carson respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's Injunction and take any such further action as this Court deems 
necessat1' · 
-,-, ,--"() 
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Addendum _,A_, 
Civil Stalking Injunction, filed March 5, 2015 
(''Injunction'') 
JEREMY M. SHORTS (USB 10983) 
DA YID R. TODD (USB 13884) 
LAW OFFICES OF JEREMY M. SHORTS, LLC 
P.O. Box 971233 
Orem, UT 84097 
Telephone: (801) 610-9879 
Fax: (801) 494-2058 
E-Mail: ieremy(tuutahevictionlaw.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 








Civil No. 140301827 
Judge Robert Adkins 
Petitioner (person who asked for the stalking injunction): 
nm ______ ___ C~a~r.~so~n-"------
First Name Middle Last 
Other people protected by this order: 
Address and phone# (to keep 
private, leave blank): 
Name Age Relationship to 
Petitioner 
417 Highland Drive 
Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
City -- State -- Zip 
435-830-8022 
Phone# 




_12._ _C ____ h___ ild ____ _ 
_8_ _,_.a...C_hi_ld __ _ 
Petitioner's attorney (if any): Jeremy M. Shorts (USB #10983) Phone# ___ 8 __ 0 ..... 1-...... 6 ...... 1 ..... 0-___ 9 __ 8_79 __ 
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Respondent 
(person who must obey this stalking injunction): 
Tom 
First Name Middle 
Barnes 
Last 













Social Security Number 
(last four digits only) 
Address Distinguishing features (scars, tattoos, limp, etc.) 
13303 Kinqsride Lane 
Street 
Driver1 s license issued by 
Houston TX 77079 
City -· State - Zip 
(State): _____ Expires _____ _ 
Warning! [ X] Weapon involved (Box to be marked if applicable). 
There was a hearing on (date): February 11, 2015 . The Respondent was given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were 
present at the hearing: 
[ X] Petitioner [ X] Petitioner's attorney (name): -.:.J.:::.:er~e.:..:.m.:.,J.y...,_M:.:.:•:...;:S:;.;.h.:..:o;.;..:rt:=-s ______ _ 
[ X] Respondent [ X] Respondent's attorney {name): """"R;...;.;..;:;ic.:..:.ha=r=d""""T __ a __ n __ n .... er _________ _ 
[ X] Other (name) Witnesses Stuart Burgess and Crystal Burgess 
The Court reviewed the Request for Civil Stalking Injunction and: c x J received argument and 
evidence. LJ accepted the stipulation of the parties, [_J entered the default of the Respondent for 
failure to appear, LI other: _____ _.. and finds that there is reason to believe that stalking 
has occurred and that the Respondent is the stalker. (Utah Code Sect77•3a•101) 
The Court finds that Respondent made numerous visits to the leased property. 
The court understands that the lease gives Respondent some reasonable right to 
inspect the leased premises. The court finds that Respondent's actions went 
beyond that reasonable right to inspect under Utah law and/or the right to inspect 
stated in the Lease (see Lease at ,T12). Respondent had previously seen Mr. & Mrs. 
Burgess on the leased property, who were legally present as either licensees, 
permitees or coworkers of Petitioner who were engaged in activity on the leased 
property for the benefit of the Petitioner. The court finds the testimony of Mr. & Mrs. 
Burgess more credible than the testimony of Respondent. Court believes that on 
October 27, 2014 and in the presence of Mr. & Mrs. Burgess, a firearm was 
displayed by Respondent and loaded with a magazine inserted into the pistol. The 
Court finds at a minimum that this constituted brandishing a weapon, which conduct 
is concerning. 
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In reviewing Utah's stalking statute (including Utah Code Ann 77-3a-106.5), the 
Court finds that Respondent did approach or confront Petitioner at the leased 
premises and that when the Petitioner was not present he returned to the leased 
premises and contacted Mr. & Mrs. Burgess. The Court finds that Respondent also 
appeared, monitored, obsetved or surveiled Petitioner's .re..sfdence. After hearing 
Respondent's explanation, the Court finds there was no real. reason to drive by 
Petitioner's residence. · 
These actions rightfully caused a concern to the Petitioner where the 
Respondent had cut a cable for the key to the generator on_ the property, previously 
showed a firearm, and had prior confrontations· on the leased premises and 
Petitioner's home. 
The Court finds that Petitioner intentionally or knowingly engaged in a course of 
conduct directed at Petitioner and knew or should have known that the course of 
conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for the person's own safety or the 
safety of a third person (Petitioner himself, his coworkers, his wife and/or his minor 
children). The Court finds that Petitioner's stalking actions occurred on more than 
two occasions. 
The Court finds that the stalking has been established. The stalking injunction 
will continue as stated herein for a period of three years. This shall include a 
restriction where the Respondent shall not be permitted to own or possess a firearm. 
Se,vice of this Order upon respondent shall be completed and effective through NEF 
E-Filing Notification to Respondent's counsel. 
The Respondent must obey all orders initialed by the judicial officer. These orders 
replace any previous temporary stalking injunction in this case. Violation of these orders is a 
criminal Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine. A second or 
subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties. 
1 [ X] 
2 [X] 
Personal Conduct Order 
Do not stalk the Petitioner. This means you must not follow, threaten, annoy, 
harass, or cause distress to the Petitioner. For a legal definition of stalking, see 
Utah Code, sections 76-5-106.5 and 77-3a-101. 
No Contact Order 
Do not contact, phone, text. mail, e-mail, or communicate either directly or 
indirectly in any way with the Petitioner and any person listed on page 1 of this 
order. 
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3 [X] Stay Away Order 
Stay away from: 
( X] a. The Petitioner's current or future: [ x J Vehicle cx1Job cx1 Home, 
premises and property (list current addresses below) 
Home address: 417 Highland Drive1 Tooele 1 Utah 84074 
Shop address: 553 North ih Street1 Tooele. Utah 84074 
Describe vehicles: 2005 Ford F-350 Truck dark gre:-t; 2013 Ford Edge 
silver; 1996 Dodge 250 red. 
C l b. Other (specify): _______________ 
5 [ X] Other Orders: Res12ondent shall not be 12ermitted to own or 12ossess a firearm. 
Warnings to the Respondent: 
• Attention: This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find you in 
contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other 
crime you may have committed in disobeying this order. 
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal 
lands. If you go to another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal 
judge can send you to prison. 
• It may be a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or 
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this civil stalking injunction is in effect. 
This order expires in three years on: ___ F __ e __ b;.;..ru ..... a __ ry..,__ ______ 1 __ 1 ______ 2 ...... 0....;.1 ..... a __ 
Month Day Year 
------END OF INJUNCTION - SIGNATURE AT TOP------
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